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Mutiny at Louisbourg, December 1744 
I 
Late in December, 1744, a mutiny erupted in the fortress of Louis-
bourg, capital of the French colony of Isle Royale. With only a few 
exceptions, all the soldiers in the garrison turned on their officers, threat-
ening to kill them and ransack the town. Faced with such complete rebel-
lion, the local authorities could only give into the insurgents' demands. 
As a result, no blood was spilled and the openly violent confrontation was 
short-lived. Nevertheless, this episode seems to be a noteworthy event in 
the military history of the eighteenth-century French empire. Unlike other 
contemporary mutinies, it occurred in wartime and involved the nearly 
unanimous participation of the soldiery. Certainly the French ,authorities 
in the Marine ministry considered it a serious matter and, as a result, 
some mutineers were severely punished at Rochefort where the garrison 
was quartered after Louisbourg surrendered to ·the English in June, 1745. 
The purpose of this essay will be, first of all, to reconstruct the events of 
the mutiny, not a simple task since the only useable sources, court-
martial transcripts and the reports of officers and colonial officials, are all 
the special pleas of men anxious to save their lives or their careers. Second-
ly, an attempt will be made to outline the long-term and immediate 
causes of the revolt. This involves an examination of some of the peculiar 
characteristics of military life in Louisbourg in the decades preceding the 
outbreak. · 
The colony of Isle Royale was established in 1713, although Louis-
bourg had only been its capital for 25 years by 1744. Administrative hub 
and centre of the. fisheries that were the mainstay of the island's econ-
omy, Louisbourg was also a military stronghold. Its .. massive stone 
fortifications were designed to protect the colony and guard the maritime 
approaches to Canada. In the year of the mutiny, the Islt< Royal~ garrison 
was .made up of nine companies of troupes de Ia marine, or compa-
g~ies !ranches de Ia marine, one of them a special artillery company, 
together with 150 men from the Swiss Karrer regiment. There wen~ about 
600-650 men in all and the majority (perhaps 525-575) were concentrated 
in the capital, leavi~g 75 soldiers to man the colony's isolated outposts. 
Soldiers - that is, military personnel excluding officers - made up about 
· one quarter of Louisbourg's population when a census was taken in 1737. 
The most important organizational unit in the. garrison was the company. 
Each compagnie franche was commanded and administered by a captain 
who was fafrly autonomous, although subordinate to the etat-major. 
This body included the town major and his assistants and the comman-
ding officer, who also generally acted as governor of the colony. 
* Graduate student, Department of History, York University. 
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The Swiss contingent with its peculiar organization and speciat priv-
ileges was a complicating element in the garrison. It apparently operated 
as a large company with three subaltern officers and almost 150 men all 
under the command of a capitaine-lieutenant. The latter, usually referred 
to as the "Swiss commandant," owed allegiance to his colonel who res-
ided at the regiment's base in France, but he was also subject to the 
control of the colonial etat-major. Colonel Karrer was bound by contract 
to maintain his regiment in the service of the Marine ministry in return for 
a monthly payment of 16livres per man. 1 In principle, he was responsible 
for recruiting, equipping, and paying his officers and men. However, in 
practice, part of the 16/ivres per man-month owed to Karrer was remitted 
directly to his officers stationed at Isle Royale for distribution as wages to 
the troops. The French authorities at Louisbourg gave rations to the 
Swiss soldiers like those issued to the men of the troupes de La marine. 
The cost of this food was retained in the colonial treasury. In effect, the 
Swiss soldiers paid for their rations through wage deductions exactly as 
the French did, even though Colonel Karrer was theoretically responsible 
for their upkeep and pay. Karrer's contract guaranteed his regiment cer-
tain special privileges, notably judicial autonomy. Most of these were 
common to all Swiss regiments in the French service. The special status 
of the Karrer contingent at Louisbourg was often a source of annoyance 
to the military and civilian administrators of the colony. Bitter disputes 
occasionally arose when the Swiss officers felt their rights were threaten-
ed.2 
II 
Isle Royale had been at peace with its neighbours during the two 
decades and more that the fortifications of Louis bourg were under construc-
tion but, in the spring of 1744, war broke out between France and 
England. In the North American possessions of the two belligerents, pri-
vateers were soon equipped to prey on enemy shipping and consequently 
one of the first effects that the war produced in Louisbourg was a short-
age of provisions and other supplies. The colony was heavily dependent 
on imported commodities but French traders hesitated to send their ships 
across the Atlantic where they might be captured. In Canada, another 
major supplier of foodstuffs, harvests were poor. To make matters worse 
in Louisbourg, hundreds of British prisoners captured by the colony's raid-
ers had to be fed in the summer and autumn. More than most other 
groups however, the soldiers of the garrison, both French and Swiss, 
were sheltered from the effects of shortages of this kind , In return for a 
constant deduction from their pay that was unaffected by market fluctua-
tions, the men received rations from the large stocks of flour, salt pork 
and other staples that the government maintained for their consumption. 
Occasionally, in times of food shortages, they would be given reduced 
1 Archive's Nationales, Archives de Ia Marine (hereafter cited as AM), AI, Art. 69, 
piece 33, Capitulation du Regiment Suisse de Karrer, 25 Sept., 173 I. 
2 See, for example, Archives Nationales , Archives des Colonies (hereafter cited as 
AC), CIIB, Vol. 23, fols. 60-64, Duquesne) to Minister, 19 Oct. , 1741. 
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rations or biscuit instead of bread so that the authorities could distribute 
supplies from the king's storehouse to needy civilians. Often the problem 
was one of food quality rather than quantity and soldiers frequently 
complained when their bread was made of rotten flour mixed with good. 3 
Thus, it was not an unprecedented development when late in 1744 the 
commissaire-ordonnateur Fran~ois Bigot, the colony's highest ranking 
civilian official, ordered the public sale of foodstuffs from the government 
storehouse and the soldiers, whose rations were still not reduced, receiv-
ed inferior provisions as a result. 
The event that pushed the garrison to revolt occurred about one 
week before Christmas when the troops received their fortnightly issue of 
"vegetables." These were the dried peas and beans which were the major 
ingredient of the soup that formed the soldiers' evening meal. In this 
case, they were rotten and completely inedible. Some men apparently be-
came ill from eating them but those who simply did without and ate only 
their bread ration and their spruce beer were in no danger of starving. 4 
What infuriated the troops was the knowledge that there were good vege-
tables in the storehouse but that these were being sold to be townspeople ; 
meanwhile, they received swills which they were obliged to pay for 
through wage deductions. A deputation of Swiss soldiers therefore at-
tempted to return the bad vegetables in exchange for good ones but was 
rebuffed by the keeper of the royal storehouse. 5 Complaints were made to 
the commander of the Karrer detachment, Gabriel Schonherr, but they 
were unavailing. 6 
About 22 or 23 December, a petition addressed to Louis Dupont 
Duchambon, the acting garrison commanding officer, was drawn up. 
Some Swiss soldiers visited the barrack-rooms of the troupes de Ia ma-
rine and secured the support of some of the French troops. 7 Thus the 
petition read, "A large number of French and Swiss soldiers very respect-
fully beg you ... ," although it seems that only the Swiss, and especially 
Abraham Dupaquier, Joseph Renard and Laurent Soly, played an active 
role at this stage. Soly, of unknown nationality, had previously served in 
the Spanish army and elsewhere. He was killed or captured early in the 
3 See, for example, ibid., Vol. 20, fols. 104-05, de Bourville to Minister, 24 Dec., 
1738. 
4 Three years earlier, they had gone without vegetables for an extended period 
although their bread ration was reduced at the same time. Ibid., Vol. 24, fols. 87-89v, Bigot to 
Minister, 18 June, 1742. 
s Archives de Ia Guerre, Archives du Service Historique de l'Armee (hereafter cited 
as A.S.H.A.), XI Deposition juridique re~ue par ordre de Monsieur de Karrer ... de Mrs. 
les officiers des detachements de Ia compagnie colonelle ... en garnison cy devant a Louis-
bourg ... a l'occasion de l'emeute a l'Isle Royale au mois de decembre 1744, 29 Aug., 1745 
(hereafter cited as "Rasser deposition."). The French may also have participated; the do-
cument is not precise on this point. 
6 Ibid. 
7 AC, C7, 272, dossier Joseph Renard, transcript of the court-martial of Joseph Re-
nard, 7 Dec., 1745 (hereafter cited as "Renard court-martial."); ibid., copy of the petition of 
a number of soldiers addressed to Duchambon, [22-23?] Dec., 1744 (hereafter cited as "Sol-
diers' Petition."). 
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siege of 1745 and therefore was never brought to trial. 8 Renard was 33 
years old, a Catholic and was born in German Lorrairie. 9 Most active of 
the three, it seems, was Dupaquier, a 25 year old native of Neuchatel. 
His family's social standing cannot have been humble as his father was 
previously lieutenant-colonel in a Swiss regiment in the service of the 
king of Sardinia. 10 It was apparently he who was chiefly responsible for 
composing the petition. Fortunately a copy has been preserved and a read-
ing of it makes it evident that rotten vegetables was not the only issue 
that annoyed the soldiers. In a deferential yet somewhat menacing tone, 
this document begins with complaints about the vegetables and then pro-
ceeds to allude to a number of other grievances after the general observa-
tion . ... vous sravez Monsieur que /'Injustice regne a touttes mains en ce 
pays ... " 11 
This petition was not handed over to the commandant immediately, 
no doubt because the soldiers did not expect it would have any more 
effect than the complaints to Schonherr if it were submitted ·in the regular 
way. Instead, plans were made for a peaceful assembly where it would be 
presented and the authorities forced to take notice. Joseph Renard 
testified at his court-martial that there was no question of assembling at 
the time the petition was drawn up and he and Dupaquier insisted that the 
idea of bringing the troops out in a mass only occurred to thein on the 
evening before the mutiny . Their testimony seems suspect however. They 
had every reason to portray their actions as a relatively sudden outburst 
(all the less culpable since they had been drinking the night of the twenty-
sixth) rather than as a premeditated plot. However, the Swiss sergeant 
Christophe Jout admitted that Soly and Renard had spoken to him the day 
before Christmas of plans ·for a peaceful protest gathering. 12 The judges 
who later tried these men did not, in fact, consider it necessary to estab-
lish the existence of a plot before December 26 in order to convict them 
and showed no interest in pursuing this question. The sources therefore 
give no . indication as to how elaborate the plot .was in the day or two 
before and after Christmas, how many soldiers were privy to it, whether 
the French were involved or whether a decision was made to bear arms 
at the projected assembly. 
Whenever the plot was hatched, it was the evening of 26 December 
that Soly, Renard and Dupaquier went from room to room in the Swiss 
section of the barracks asking the men to join them, "pour s' assembler le 
landemain afin de demander a leurs off. rs de leur procurer Justice sur les 
Vivres qui leurs Etoient dus ... " 13 Some of the men were sleeping but Re-
nard made a list of the names of those who agreed to participate. 
8 Renard court-martial . 
9 Ibid. 
10 AC, E , 157, dossier Abraham Dupaquier, transcript of the court-martial of Abra-
ham Dupaquier, 9 Dec., 1745 (hereafter cited as "Dupaquier court-martial ."). 
11 Soldiers' Petition; 
12 AC. E. 233, dossier Christophe Jout, transcript of the court"martial of Christophe 
Jout, 9 Dec., 1745 (hereafter cited as "Jout court-martial."). 
13 Renard court-martial. 
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Afterwards, Renard and Dupaquier were nominated to go to speak with 
the Fr~nch soldiers who occupied adjoining rooms.14 Dupaquier was sent 
because he "knew the French," apparently a rare quality for a member, of 
the Karrer detachment. He admitted to having communicated with only a 
few men in two of the eight French companies and he claims that he mere-
ly informed them of the Swiss plans for an assembly. The three leaders 
then retutned to their room and remained awake for the rest of the night. 
Next morning, the twenty-seventh, at about six o:clock, the Swiss 
began assembling behind the barracks building in the courtyard enclo~ed 
by the King's Bastion. Although this gathering was completely unauthor-
ized and illegal, it was effected through the use of normal military proce-
dures and routine discipline. The sergeants did not appear as most , of 
them had their own dwellings in the town. However, a corporal named du 
Croix, who had apparently not been involved in the plans, took charge 
and arranged the men in their ranks, ordered the drummers to beat out 
the signal for the assembly and returned to the barracks to order those 
who had not yet appeared to fall in. 15 He even overruled one of the lead-
ing organizers, Joseph Renard, and ordered him to return to his place 
when the latter began to take some initiative. Dupaquier and Renard later ~o 
declared at the court-martial that they had not intended to carry arms but 
had changed their minds when all the others went' for their guns after a 
voice in the crowd had urged them to "give more weight to their just 
demands." They may well have been lying. In any case, the officer who 
was eventually fetched by the first sergeant found himself facing almost 
the entire Karerr detachme.nt, armed and in battle formation. 
Schonherr was sick at the time and it was Ensign Rasser, the second 
Swiss officer, who first met the rebellious troops. 16 When the drumming 
ceased Rasser asked for an explanation and was handed a note which out-
lined the men's grievances. 17 He examined this and then spoke with a 
few individual soldiers, one by one, about their complaints. When the 
ensign recalled the scene eight months later, he remembered the troops' or-
derly and respectful behavior and their assurances that they had no inten-
tion of committing violent actions or of neglecting their duties to their 
spperiors; they wished only "de Reclamer leur Justice des Vexations 
qu' on leur Faisoit Journellement ... " 18 Rasser mentioned three specific 
grievances in this affidavit and prominent among them was the problem of 
14 Dupaquier court-martial. 
15 AC. E. 145, dossier Jean-Baptiste du Croix, transcript of the court-martial of 
Jean-Baptiste du Croix, 7 Dec., 1745 (hereafter cited as "du Croix court-martial."). 
16 Rasser deposition. 
17 Renard court"martial; Dupaquier court-martial. The testimony does not make it 
clear whether this was the same petition to Ducltambon that was written several days 
earlier. Dupaquier testified that he wrote a note outlining grievances the morning of the de-
monstration. He may have been lying in order to be consistent with his story that there was 
no plot before 26 December. Since the specific complaints that Rasser recalled were not the 
same as those listed in the petition to Duchambon, it is quite possible that Dupaquier drew 
up a second petition shortly before the' mutiny began. 
18 Rasser deposition. 
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the rotten vegetables. There was also a complaint about work the soldiers 
were forced to perform without wages for the king's service and for private 
individuals. Lastly, the men asked for compensation for work they had 
done on an expedition against Canso earlier in the year and for the pillage 
they had been promised but had never received. 19 
The complaint about unpaid labour was not a new one for the Swiss. 
In 1727 they had contested the custom of ''piquoit'' duty by which the 
etat-major made soldiers coming off guard duty spend a few hours clean-
ing the barracks or doing chores in the government storehouse. 20 The 
practice persisted however and Joseph Renard complained of having to 
fetch wood and clean the governor's latrine. 21 Men were often obliged to 
work without remuneration for their own officers as well. 22 Both Renard 
and Dupaquier declared at their court-martials that such "ouvrages 
extraordinaires" were a major source of dissatisfaction. 
The treatment of the soldiers who took part in the Canso raid was a 
specific case that aroused the anger of both French and Swiss troops. 
Soon after war broke out in March, 1744, plans had been made to capture 
this nearby English fishing post. In its aims and its organization, the 
Canso expedition bore more resemblance to a privateering venture than to 
a normal military campaign. 23 It was largely financed by merchants and 
government officials and was composed of soldiers from the Louisbourg 
garrison as well as over 200 sailors all under the command of Dupont Du-
vivier, an influential officer of the troupes de Ia marine. Duquesnel, the 
colony's governor, convinced 80 French soldiers and 37 Swiss to vol-
unteer for the mission with the promise that they would have a share of 
the booty. 24 A small fleet left Louisbourg the twentieth of May and quickly 
captured Canso and a British naval sloop after a short exchange of can-
non fire. 25 The soldiers saw no action until they landed and were ordered 
to load quantities of codfish, government stores and the private effects of 
the British inhabitants into the boats. When some hesitated they were 
roughly treated by their officers. ''Le moindre des Miserables seroit 
mieux traitte parmi des barbares," wrote the men who served on board 
one of the boats. 26 As soon as the victorious party returned to Louis-
bourg, the ships' officers and sailors and the garrison officers who had 
19 These are the same three complaints that Renard and Dupaquier later mentioned 
at their court-martials. 
20 AC, CllB, Vol. 9, fols. 72-78v, St-Ovide to Minister, 21 Nov., 1727. 
21 Renard court-martial. 
22 Antony Steur seems to have been in this case when he passed the winter of 1739 
at Spanish Bay hunting partridges for the benefit of Cailly, the Swiss commander. AC, Outre-
mer, G2, Vol. 185, fols, 379-424, trial of Jean Larue dit le Gascon, accused of murder, 16 
Mar. - 30 Apr., 1739. For evidence of similar illicit practices in the French companies, see 
AC, CllB, Vol. ll, fols, 61-68, de Mezy to Minister, 4 Dec., 1730. 
23 George Juan DE ULLOA And Antonio DE ULLOA, A Voyage to South America 
(trans. J. Hopkins) vol. II (London: 1806), p. 380. 
24 AC, F3, Vol. 50, fol. 415, an account of the Canso expedition, n.s., n.d. [1744]. 
25 G.A. RAWLYK, Yankees at Louisbourg (Orono, Maine: 1967), pp. 3-5. 
26 AC, Outremer, G2, Vol. 188, fols. 304-05, Requette aM. Bigot de Marin Halest et 
25 autres volontaires, 8 Nov., 1744. 
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accompanied them made off with most of the plunder before anything was 
turned over to the courts to be distributed as lawful prize. In the end, the 
soldiers received nothing for their trouble. Governor Duquesnel, who had 
guaranteed them a share of the spoils, died on 9 October and, although 
one group of soldiers addressed a petition to the ordonnateur in Novem-
ber, they received no satisfaction. 27 
Rasser listened to these grievances in the courtyard of the citadel. 
He promised only to communicate them to his superior, Schonherr. Then, 
warning the men not to repeat their demonstration, he made them present 
arms and ordered them to return to the barracks and stay there. This 
done, the ensign rushed to Schonherr's bedside and reported the disturb-
ance. The senior officer told Rasser to ask de la Perelle, the town major, 
to order the replacement of the bad vegetables. But already it was too 
late. As he emerged from Schonherr's house, the drums were beating 
again. This time it was the French sounding the general alarm. After their 
officer had left, it seems, some Swiss soidiers had gone to the other side 
of the barracks and reproached the French as cowards for not joining in 
the demonstration. The men of the troupes de Ia marine may have been 
slow to act but once they took up the challenge they were far less restrained 
than the others. With their intervention the relatively mild protest was 
transformed into a serious revolt. 
Soldiers, both French and Swiss, poured out into the courtyard 
equipped for battle. The drummers continued to beat the generate and, as 
their comrades assembled, they marched out of the citadeF8 surrounded 
by an escort with bayonets fixed. As this body passed through the streets 
of the town, the garrison officers, who for the most part lived in private 
houses, were roused by what must have sounded like a signal that the 
fortress was under attack. Coming to the citadel to investigate, they found 
themselves facing the muskets of men who threatened to ''blow their 
heads off" if they entered the enclosure. 29 These were the ten soldiers, 
French and Swiss, who had spent the night on routine guard duty at the 
entrance to the citadel under the command of the Swiss sergeant, Chris-
tophe Jout. Soly and Renard had spoken with him three days earlier 
about their plans for a demonstration and, the morning of the mutiny, 
Jout ordered his sentries not to allow any officers or civilians to pass. As 
the party of drummers marched by the guard post, he was heard to say, 
"Les franrois commencent a s' animer et ils font mieux les choses que les 
notres Etant armes Bayonnette au Bout fusil." 30 
Eventually a number of Officers managed to elude the sentries and 
gain entry to the courtyard. Among them was Ensign Rasser who describ-
ed the scene inside as one of tumult and disorder. The soldiers talked 
27 Ibid. 
28 The King's Bastion and the barracks building formed an enclosed citadel usually 
referred to in French as "le fort." The "fortress," on the other hand, was the town together 
with the entire system of fortifications. 
29 Rasser deposition. 
Jo Jout court-martial. 
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openly of killing all the officers and burning the town. The officers present 
tried desperately with bravado and cajoling to regain control of their 
companies. According to Rasser, he brought the Karrer contingent to 
obedience first while the French were still pointing guns at their officers 
and threatening to shoot if their dema1,1ds were not met. 31 Meanwhile, 
Major de Ia Perelle was following the drummers and their escort through the 
town vainly ordering them to halt. At one point, he attempted to stand in 
their path but he was picked up roughly and carried thirty paces.32 Giving 
up at length, he went to the citadel where by now the atmosphere had 
cooled somewhat. The officers had apparently agreed to accept all the 
rebels' ~demands and the men showed their willingness to recognize de Ia 
Pen!lle's authority by following, more or less, his parade-ground 
commands. · 
Before the major's arrival, acting Governor Duchambon, the 
supreme military authority in the , colony, had appeared at the citadel and 
surrendered to the troops' demands. Duchambon had no alternative but 
capitulation'. His garrison, almost to a man, was in open revolt. 33 At the 
best of times, help from France or Canada would take months to arrive 
but, given the war and British comiTI.and of the seas, the colony was partic-
ularly isolated in 1744. Moreover, there. was no alternative force within 
the colony that could dream of opposing the rebels, as the Isle Royale 
militia, unlike its Canadian counterpart, was small and ineffective. The 
promise to redress all grievances quelled the violence, but the soldiers 
remained uneasy. Duchambon and Bigot, writing to · the Minister · of 
Marine four days later, declared that the complaints of the French and the 
Swiss were identical but the specific demands they mentioned as having 
come from the French troops were not the same as those presented to 
Rasser by the Swiss. The situation was confused and a great variety of 
demands were apparently put forward. The governor and ordonnateur re-
corded three of them: (I) an increase-in the issue of firewood and the re-
turn to the soldiers of five cords of wood confiscated for theft; (2) the 
immediate distribution of the rations that some of the men had missed 
cause they were away participating in the Canso attack and in a later ex-
pedition against Port Royai, and (3) the reimbursement of the clothing de-
duction that had been taken from the wages of more than 100 French 
recruits who had arrived in 1741 but never received the uQiforms it was 
supposed to have paid for. 34 
The second demand in Duchambon's and Bigot's list was not repeat-
ed in any other document. It is possible that, in reporting to the minister, 
they may have misinterpreted or misrepresented much more serious 
complaints _ about the treatment of volunteers during and after the Canso 
3t Rasser deposition. 
32 AC. CllB, Vol. 26, fols: 231-34, "Copie de Ia Lettre ecritte a Mr. le Comte de 
Maurepas par Mrs, Duchambon et Bigot a Louisbourg le Jie Xhre 1744," [31 Dec., 1744] 
(hereafter cited as "Duchambon's and Bigot's letter."). 
33 Duchambon and Bigot reported that only the French sergeants and the thirty men 
of the elite artillery company refused to join in the mutiny. Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
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raid. At any rate, the only contemporary account of the mutiny not writ-
ten by an observer directly involved in the events considered injustices 
committed ·against the Canso volunteers to be the major grievance of all 
the soldiers. 35 the complaint about the missing uniforms was a uniquely 
French affair but it had much in common with the rotten vegetables prob-
lem which aroused the anger of both French and Swiss troops. The sol-
diers had often endured with patience delays and shortages in the issue of 
military supplies and allowances but they were annoyed that wage deduc-
tions were not adjusted when items they paid for were not delivered. 
The soldiers' demand for more firewood cannot have come as a sur-
prise to the local authorities as they had long been aware that fuel 
supplies were inadequate. Within a few years of founding of Louisbourg the 
scrubby spruce forest had been stripped from all the country within three 
miles. The minister in France was eventually persuaded to allow wood to 
be purchased for the garrison but only at the rate of one half cord per 
man even though about twice that quantity was required to last through 
the long Cape Breton winter. 36 The men were therefore obliged to cut and 
transport half their fuel and each year several of them contracted frostbite 
and injured themselves scrambling over the brush and stumps in order to 
fetch a few logs of what was in fact inferior firewood. The exceptionally 
cold winter that had arrived earlier than usual in 1744 must have made the 
mutineers' demand for an adequate fuel supply especially emphatic.J7 As 
for the confiscation before Christmas of five cords of "stolen" wood, the 
soldiers petition to Duchambon alluded to this event in rather different 
terms. It seems that a group of soldiers returning to the town with a load 
of firewood were met by some officers claiming to own the land where it 
had been cut. The officers ordered them to turn over the wood and then 
broke the sledge they had used to carry it. 38 
Military discipline and punishment, wages, the routine hardships of 
service and the dangers of war do not seem to have been issues for the 
mutinous soldiers. Instead, their objectives were extremely modest. They 
showed no desire in their words or actions to modify the military system 
or to subvert the hierarchical structure of the garrison except as a tem-
porary emergency measure. All the recorded grievances that were brought 
up by the French and the Swiss were essentially complaints about mate-
rial losses and the redress the men sought was monetary compensation. 
Consequently, one of the rebels' first acts was to make use of the 
established sentry posts in the town to secure control of the government 
storehouses and the house of Fran~ois Bigot, the nian in charge of 
finances and guardian of the colonial treasury. 39 The governor and the offi-
35 ANON., Lettre d'un Habitant de Louisbourg (trans., ed., G.M. Wrong) (Toronto: 
1897), p. 34. 
36 AC, C11B, Vol. 23, fo1s. 13-14v, Duquesne) and Bigot to Minister, 10 Oct., 1741. 
37 DE ULLOA, op. cit., p. 375. 
38 Soldiers ' Petition. 
39 ANON., Memoire pour Messire Fran~ois Bigot, ci-devant Intendant de Justice, 
Police, Finance & Marine en Canada, Accuse: contre Monsieur le Procureur-General du Roi 
en Ia Commission, Accusateur, vol. I (Paris: 1763), pp. 7-9. 
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cers had promised to give in to the soldiers' demands but it was up to Bisot 
to make the actual payments. Of course, had they wished, the mutineers 
could simply have seized what they wanted but, despite repeated threats 
to do so, they never undertook such bold action. Apparently interpreting 
Duchambon's surrender as implicit recognition that their demands were 
justified, the soldiers ended their complete and open defiance of the 
officers and proceded to secure what they felt was legitimately theirs in a 
fairly orderly fashion. 
A deputation went to call on Bigot to arrange for the fulfillment of 
the officers' promises and presented the commissaire-ordonnateur with 
accounts of sums due to all the men for injustices committed over the 
past few years. It is not clear how long the negotiations lasted but the 
deputies apparently returned on several occasions over a period of 
months. Bigot later bragged of how he stalled and prevaricated with the 
representatives, "les amusant de belles promesses" and avoiding payment 
for as long as possible until frightened into submission by veiled threats 
against his life. 40 His own accounts indicate that only 3000 livres were giv-
en to the men. This would have amounted to an average of about six 
livres, the price of three or four bottles of wine, for each man in the garri-
son.41 
Although there were no further dramatic confrontations like the one 
that took place on the morning of 27 December, Louis bourg remained in a 
state of alarm in the days that followed. The civilian population was 
terrified as groups of soldiers spoke openly of massacres and destruction 
and engaged in a form of taxation populaire, threatening merchants with 
swords and forcing them to sell them goods at what they considered a 
"just price. " 42 Bigot and Duchambon described this situation when they 
first reported their predicament to the minister on 31 December. Their let-
ter had a tone of urgency that verged on panic: "Nous sommes ici leurs 
Esclaves, ils font tout le mal qu'ils veulent." 43 Bigot outlined the elab-
orate precautions he took to keep this communication and its destination a 
secret. He was convinced that the troops would sack the town and turn it 
over to the English if they knew he was requesting that an armed force be 
sent from France to punish the rebels. And yet the fact that no one was 
killed or even injun~d. the absence in the records of complaints from mer-
chants who actually sustained losses and, most of all, the soldiers' sub-
sequent conduct during the siege, all lead to the conclusion that these men 
40 Ibid., p. 8. 
41 AC, CIIC, Vol. 12, fol. 167, "Bordereaux de Ia recette et depense faitte ii /'Isle 
Royalle pendant l'annee [1744]," 2 Apr., 1746. 
42 Price-setting of this sort was a common feature of eighteenth-century insurrec-
tions, especially bread riots in England and France. See, George RuoE., The Crowd in His-
tory; a Study of Popular Disturbances in France and England (New York: 1964), especially 
pp. 19-32; E. P. THOMPSON, "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth 
Century," Past and Present, no. 50 (Feb., 1971), 76-136. Only one account of the mutiny 
(Duchambon's and Bigot's letter) reports any manifestation of this type of behavior. The 
other documents mention vague threats to sack the town but they give no evidence of hostil-
ity on the part of the soldiers directed specifically against the merchants. 
43 Duchambon's and Bigot's letter. 
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were remarkably restrained in the use of every weapon except their 
mouths. Certainly the soldiers were extremely angry. The situation was 
an explosive one that could easily have erupted into open violence but the 
mutineers seemed well aware that their bravado and threats frightened the 
authorities and had the effect of advancing their own interests. Moreover, 
it was no accident that the mutiny occurred at a time when the state of 
war and rumours of impending British attack strengthened the soldiers' 
position by making the officers and colonial officials feel all the more vul-
nerable. 
Unfortunately, it is impossible to discover exactly what happened in 
the early months of 1745 since the best sources, the court-martials and 
Ensign Rasser's deposition, concentrate exclusively on the period up to 
and including the morning of the assembly. For the courts of military jus-
tice, it was this act of defying and threatening officers that constituted the 
crime of mutiny and they showed no interest in its aftermath. However, 
according to Franc;:ois Bigot, the only informant for the later period, the 
revolt lasted five months. Tout l'hiver se passa dans cette emotion, he 
wrote, stating elsewhere that the troops n' avoient pour ainsy dire re-
connu aucune autorite from December to May, 1745. 44 Bigot of course 
is not the most trustworthy of witnesses and he had an obvious interest 
in exaggerating the duration of the mutiny and his own role in handling it. 
It would be more accurate to describe this period as one of latent rather 
than open revolt. The men had recognized the officers' authority after 
their capitulation in the courtyard, but the latter must have exercised that 
authority with the greatest of caution. Unwilling to overturn the estab-
lished hierarchy, the soldiers were nevertheless in a position of unaccus-
tomed power at this time and they used the threat of violence to ensure 
that those in command treated them fairly according to their own stan-
dards. The officers and civilian officials did not dare oppose them and 
even avoided using le ton de leurs places. 45 This was hardly a normal 
situation and, in Bigot's eyes, it constituted continued revolt. 
Nor do we know how the soldiers organized themselves at this stage, 
how they chose their representatives or how they managed the business 
of compiling their demands for compensation and distributing the procedes. 
Bigot mentions in passing that the men elected their own officers and he 
describes the deputies who negotiated with him simply as les plus sedi-
tieux. 46 He felt that most of the rebel leaders were Swiss and that Abra-
ham Dupaquier was most prominent among them. Bigot noted no dissen-
sion between the men of the troupes de Ia marine and those of the Karrer 
regiment and, in fact, he gives the impression that they co-operated more 
fully in the period of negotiations than they had earlier. In any case, what-
ever the state of relations within the garrison may have been, the entire 
•• Anon., Memoire pour Messire Franr;ois Bigot ... , I, p. 8; AC, Dep<)t des Fortifica-
tions des Colonies, Am. Sept., no. d'ordre 218, Bigot, "Relation du siege de Louisbourg," 
15 Aug., 1745. 
45 ANoN., Memoire pour Messire Franr;ois Bigot ... , I, p . 8. 
46 Ibid. 
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situation changed drastically with the intervention of an outside force six 
months after the outbreak of revolt. 
When the New Englanders landed to lay siege to Louisbourg 11 
May, 1745, Duchambon assembled the garrison and urged the troops to 
forget the past and unite with the officers and townspeople in facing the 
enemy. The men demurred at first and asked for a guarantee that no one 
would be punished for taking part in the mutiny. Naturally the governor 
consented and, together with Bigot, solemnly promised a complete pardon 
in the name of the king.47 In the subsequent fifty-day siege the troops ac-
cording to all reports acquitted themselves well.48 At no time had they 
ever questioned or attempted to evade what they considered to be their 
duty as soldiers. Still, when they were called upon to repair the fortifica-
tions that were damaged by cannon fire, they would only work for double 
the normal labourer's wage and with immediate payment in cash. 49 
Perhaps twenty or thirty soldiers were killed before the town surrendered 
at the end of June,50 and among the first casualties was Laurent Soly, one 
of the principal Swiss instigators of the mutiny. 
After the surrender of Louisbourg the garrison was evacuated and 
most of its members arrived at the French port of Rochefort in August, 
1745. The French companies were later sent back to Isle Royale in 1749 
when the colony returned to French rule, but a great many, perhaps the 
majority, of the men who had experienced the mutiny and siege died or 
deserted before the garrison was re-established. 51 No detachment from 
the Karrer regiment ever went back .to Isle Royale as Duchambon and 
Bigot convinced Maurepas, the Minister of Marine, that it was the Swiss 
who had not only initiated the mutiny but also led the French soldiers in 
the days that followed the first outbreak. 52 
III 
Although aware that the garrison had fought well, Maurepas felt that 
news of the soldiers' discontent had determined the English to attack 
Louisbourg and he tended to blame the mutiny for the fall of the for-
tress. 53 Perhaps a certain desire to identify a scapegoat for the loss of Isle 
47 Ibid., p. 9. 
48 Ibid.; AC, C11C, Duchambon to Minister, 23 Sept., 1745. Two Swiss deserted and 
one French soldier was executed for treason during the siege but this is not a sign of exces-
sive disaffection by eighteenth century standards. 
49 AC, P, Vol. 50, fol. 378v, BIGOT, "Sur Ia prise de Louisbourg", Aug., 1745. 
so One list of casualties reported a total of 50 deaths on the French side but this 
includes civilians as well as soldiers. AC, F3, Vol. 50, fol. 407, n.d., n.s. 
51 AC, D 2C, Vol. 48, "Lisle des Soldats des Troupes servant ci devant a /'Isle 
Royale desertes ii Rochefort," [n.d.], [n.s.]; AC, B, Vol. 84-2, fol. 289, Maurepas to de 
Serigny, 10 Feb., 1746. 
52 Duchambon's and Bigot's Jetter; AC, B, Vol. 82-2, fol. 377, Maurepas to Karrer, 
14 Sept., 1745. 
53 AC, B, Vol. 82-2, fol. 369, Maurepas to de Barrailh, 20 Aug. , 1745; ibid., fol. 377, 
Maurepas to Karrer, 14 Sept., 1745. In fact, news of the mutiny could not have reached 
New England in time to affect the plan to attack Louisbourg. Reports in the summer and fall 
of 1744 of low morale in the garrison however did encourage the New Englanders to attempt 
the invasion. RAWLYK, op. cit., pp. 27-57. 
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Royale accounts for the minister's insistence on the need for severe pun-
ishment to restore discipline among the colonial troops. In August, 1745, 
he instructed de Barrailh, the governor of Rochefort, to make discreet in-
quiries on the subject of the Louisbourg mutiny and to arrest those 
identified as ring-leaders by the colonial commander and ordonnateur. 
When court-martials were organized late in the fall, Maurepas ordered 
them to look into the soldiers' complaints against their officers.54 There 
was no excuse for rebellion but Maurepas, who was well aware that irreg-
ularities had long been common in the Isle Royale garrison, intended to 
take some disciplinary action against those officers whose unfair treat-
ment of the men had been particularly flagrant. The records give no indic-
ation that any officer was ever actually punished. 
In view of the special status of the Karrer regiment, the Swiss mu-
tineers could only be tried by court-martials composed of their own 
officers. These were held in the second half of November, 1745. A num-
ber of those accused were released but five men were convicted and sen-
tenced to death. 55 Of these, one died in prison and another, Abraham 
Dupaquier, escaped. Fran~ois Bigot was furious when he learned that the 
premier chef of the rebels had escaped the noose. Si celuy de qui de-
pendoit sa surete eut ete pendant six mois a Ia discretion de ce miserable, 
comme je I' ay ete, he wrote, il seroit encore en prison. 56 Maurepas 
was also displeased, all the more so as there were hints that Colonel Kar-
rer and his officers may have intentionally provided the Lieutenant-
Colonel's son with an opportunity to flee. 57 Some of Dupaquier' s comrades 
were not so fortunate. Joseph Renard and Corporal du Croix were 
hanged on 7 December and their bodies were left on the gallows at Ro-
chefort all day, afin de servir d' exemple a un chacun. 58 Two days 
later, Christophe Jout was decapitated hours after appearing before the 
court-martial where he expressed the hope that he too would be an exam-
ple to others . 
... il savoit bien qu'il alloit perdre Ia Vie ... mais que son Exemple devoit 
apprendre aux off s. command1• pour le Roy de tenir Ia main a ce que le soldat 
ne jut point Vexe et que Luy jut distribue bons conformem1• a /'intention de sa 
majeste les Vivres payes sur leur so/de ... 59 
The court-martials of the French mutineers were delayed for a time 
when the accused brought up the pardon they had been promised by Du-
chambon and Bigot. Maurepas quickly intervened however, declaring that 
the king could not be bound by the promise since he had had no 
knowledge of it and insisting that examples be made of some of the men 
54 AC, B, Vol. 82-2, fol. 403, Maurepas to de Barrailh, 23 Nov., 1745. 
55 AC, C11C, Vol. 9, fols. 118-21, Bigot to Maurepas, 11 Dec., 1745. 
56 Collection de Manuscrits contenant lettres, memoires, et autres documents histo-
riques relatifs a Ia Nouvelle-France vol. III (Quebec: 1884), p. 271 (Bigot to Minister, 2 
Dec., 1745.). 
51 AC, B, Vol. 82-2, fol. 412, Maurepas to Karrer, 10 Dec., 1745; ibid., fol. 415, 
Minister to de Barrailh, 15 Dec., 1745. 
58 Du Croix court-martial. 
59 Jout court-martial. 
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of the troupes de Ia marine. We have no accounts of the French court-
martials but other records indicate that at least eight men were condamned. 
Five of these were hanged in January, 1746, one died in prison and 
two were sentenced to life terms as galley slaves. 60 In all, eight men were 
executed as a result of the Louis bourg mutiny, making it a more severely 
punished event than any of the revolts Andre Corvisier mentions in his 
study of the French army from 1700 to 1763.61 
Because of the limitations of the historical sources, our knowledge 
of the mutiny is far from complete. Still, it seems sufficient to support a 
few conclusions about the basic nature of the event which should be re-
viewed as a preliminary to an analysis of the mutiny's origins. Occurring 
at a time when the state of war provided the soldiers with a favourable 
opportunity for successful action and touched off by an ·issue of spoiled 
vegetables, the revolt was essentially an armed assembly of protest intend-
ed to achieve some limited objectives. Almost all the men in the garrison 
were involved and they demanded material compensation for certain 
specific grievances. They did not attempt to depose their superiors but rath-
er frightened them into complying with their wishes. If the mutineers' 
behaviour was restrained considering the circumstances, it must not be 
supposed that they acted with cool detachment in the pursuit of rationally 
defined goals. In fact, they were extremely angry. Simply by disobeying 
and threatening the officers, they committed an offense punishable by 
death. They would not likely have done so if their resentment was not 
deeply rooted and if they did not have more at stake than a few livres. 
Some of the rebels' spleen was vented against the merchants of the town 
and against Fran~ois Bigot but the primary target of their ire was the 
officers. Whereas actions against Louisbourg's civilians were sporadic and 
relatively mild, only the officers had to face the assembled muskets and 
staunch hostility of their men. 
IV 
In attempting to explain the Louis bourg mutiny, historians have tend-
ed to emphasize two causal factors, the officers' exploitation of the men 
and the soldiers' miserable living conditions.62 The mutineers certainly 
felt they had been cheated by their officers but nowhere in the documents 
concerned with the mutiny is there any hint (beyond the reference to a 
demand for more firewood) that they revolted because they were "disgust-
ed with their living conditions." 63 It is true that the material conditions 
of life were very hard for the men of the Louisbourg garrison but gener-
60 AC, D 2C, Vol. 53, "Isle Royale. Rolle general des Troupes franroises commence 
en 1739," n.d., n.s.; Archives Maritimes, Port de Rochefort (hereafter cited as Port de 
Rochefort), IE, 141, Maurepas to Ricouart, 18 Jan., 1746. 
6t Andre CoRVISIER, L'Armee Franraise de La fin du XVII ' siecle au ministere de 
Choiseul; le Soldat (Paris: 1964) , p. 883 . 
62 Guy FREGAULT, Franrois Bigot, Administrateur franrais (Montreal: 1948), I p. 
207 ; Rawlyk, op. cit. , pp. 71-72 ; Robert J. MoRGAN and Terrence D. MACLEAN, "Social 
Structure and Life in Louisbourg," Canada, an Historical Magazine, I (June, 1974), p. 66. 
63 RAWLYK,op. cit., p. 71. 
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ally they were no worse, and in many respects they were better, than 
those to which other eighteenth-century soldiers were subjected. A 
Louisbourg soldier did not always receive his rations in the prescribed 
amounts or qualities but he could easily supplement his diet by hunting 
and scrounging and never went hungry as his counterparts in France often 
did when they were in the field or in peacetime when sudden rises in food 
prices would occasionally make them unable to subsist on their fixed 
money allowance. 64 His annual issue of clothing was often defective an 
sometimes was not delivered for years in a row. Still, he was no worse 
off than soldiers in the French infrantry and he could consider himself 
blessed in comparison to the men of the Albany garrison in 1700 who were, 
according to the governor of New York, in a "shameful and miserable 
condition for the want of cloaths that the like was never seen in so much 
that those parts of 'em which modesty forbids me to name, are expos'd to 
view. " 65 He was not given an adequate supply of firewood and, although 
this did not make him unique among soldiers of the period, he may have 
suffered more from it than men who served in France because of the 
severe climate of Isle Royale. As for the "squalid and oppressive barrack 
conditions" that supposedly "led to the mutiny, " 66 the Louis bourg bar-
racks were certainly not luxurious accommodation but they were prob-
ably more comfortable than the stuffy and disease-ridden barracks at Aix 
and less crowded than those in Marseilles where 30 or 40 men lived in a . 
room with seven beds, "comme du betail dans une ecurie. " 67 In fact, the 
soldiers' rooms were repaired and the bedding improved in the early 
1740s so that they would likely have been more comfortable in 1744 than 
they had been in earlier periods.68 In general, the notion that the men of 
the Louisbourg garrison were particularly wretched by contemporary 
standards is difficult to accept in view of their exceptionally low mortality 
rates. 
Misery and hardship were the common characteristics of all soldiers 
in the eighteenth century, and of a great many civilians as well. Their 
presence alone accounts for neither the turbulence of the Louisbourg sol-
diers nor the loyalty of other, more wretched troops. Neither does it help 
to explain the timing of the mutiny which occurred when the men of the 
colonial garrison were, in some respects, better off than they had ever 
been in the past. The revolt should therefore not be dismissed simply as 
an emeute de misere; instead, it should be understood as the reaction of a 
group of men with a certain set of material interests and attitudes faced 
with a particular combination of circumstances. The main motive for the 
soldiers' uprising was the economic exploitation to which their officers 
M CORVISIER, op. cit., pp. 834-36. 
65 Quoted in W.J. EccLES, "The Social, Economic, and Political Significance of the 
Military Establishment in New France," Canadian Historical Review, LII (March, 1971), 
p. 6. 
66 MoRGAN and MAcLEAN, lac. cit . , Cf., Fregault, lac. cit. 
67 Quoted in Albert BABEAU , La Vie militaire sous /'Ancien Regime . Vol. I , Les 
Soldats (Paris: 1889), pp. 85-88. 
68 For example, new sheets and mattresses replaced the vermin-infested straw in the 
barracks rooms in 1740. AC, CllB, Vol. 22, fols. 40-40v, de Bourville and Bigot to Minister, 
20 Oct., 1740. 
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subjected them. Variations in the intensity of this exploitation along with 
the mens' evaluation of the prospects for successful violent action help to 
explain the timing of the event. 
v 
More important however are the "structural causes" of the mutiny. 
These are the enduring characteristics of the soldier's position in the 
Louisbourg garrison which generally encouraged the formation of group 
habits of thought and action among the soldiers and kept them at odds 
with the officers. Obviously, the first pre-condition of concerted group ac-
tion is the existence of a group with some common interest and awareness 
of itself. The structure of military life in Louisbourg from about 1720 to 
1744 formed such a group of the soldiers and enabled them to react col-
lectively to the situation that arose in 1744. Besides the positive factors 
promoting unity among the men, there were negative factors which in-
tensified solidarity through common hostility to the officers. The colony's 
system of recruitment emphasized the division between soldiers and 
officers and was one of the most important of these negative factors. 
Of course, officers and soldiers occupied very different positions in 
the social hierarchy of the eighteenth century. In the Isle Royale garrison, 
however, the gulf between the two groups was exaggerated, partly 
because of the very different backgrounds of their members. The officers of 
the troupes de Ia marine had very strong roots in the Louisbourg commu-
nity. Most of those serving in 1744 had been born in the colony or had 
come from elsewhere in North America at an early age. They had exten-
sive ties of kinship and marriage with their fellow-officers and with the 
Louisbourg merchants who were often their business partners as well. 
Their men, on the other hand, were almost all born in France and came 
to Isle Royale as isolated individuals. Parish and judicial records provide 
the places of birth in France of 67 men of the French companies between 
1720 and 1745. Of these, 31 (46 per~ent) were born in towns and cities (12 
in Paris alone), a disproportionate urban representation in a country 
where about 5/6 of the population was born in the country. 69 The back-
grounds of members of the Karrer detachment were extremely diverse but 
they did not distinguish officers from soldiers in any clear way. However, 
the impersonal recruitment practices of both the French and Swiss el-
ements of the Isle Royale garrison reinforced the alienation of soldiers and 
officers. 
In the regular army, each captain was responsible for recruiting men 
to fill the vacancies in his company. Ideally he solicited recruits from the 
same region year after year and would have some knowledge of the' pop-
ulace and they of him. 70 In many cases, the family estate provided a cap-
69 This sample is too small to be statistically valid, but it does suggest that the 
proportion of urban recuits was much greater in the troupes de Ia marine than in the regular 
French army where about 30% of the men were born in towns. CoRVISIER, op. cit. , pp. 390, 
394. 
· 
70 DE GUJGNARD, L 'Ecole de Mars tome I (Paris: 1725), p. 682; CoRVISIER, op. cit. , 
pp. 163-78. 
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tain with a steady supply of replacements and this "feudal recruitment" 
was, according to the most eminent historian of the French army, an 
important factor promoting cohesion in many companies where the officers 
and some of tbe men would be linked in a paternalistic relationship that 
often predated their entry into the military. 71 In actual practice however, 
much of the manpower needs of the eighteenth-century army were 
supplied by professional recruiters whose only interest was in collecting the 
cash payment they earned for each body they delivered and whose un-
scrupulous methods for extracting signatures from young men earned them 
the pejorative title of "racoleurs." The impersonal practice of "racolage" 
divorced the act of recruitment from the responsibilities of command. 
While it was not uncommon in the regular army, it was all but universal 
in the colonial troupes de Ia marine and in the Karrer regiment. 72 
The men who eventually came to Louisbourg then, did not enlist in 
a particular company under a particular officer. In fact, few of them could 
have been certain when they signed their names that they would be sent 
to Isle Royale and not another colony. Until the 1720s, recruits for all the 
French colonies were gathered together at the lie d'Oleron near Roche-
fort, and then embarked on ships bound for Canada, Isle Royale or the 
Caribbean with no regard for the wishes of the men involved. 73 In later 
years, a certain number of troops were raised each year specifically for 
the Isle Royale garrison but there was always a certain amount of 
shuffling and mixing of recruits at Rochefort so that a man destined for 
service in one colony could easily end up in another. 74 
In the troupes de Ia marine, recruitment was not only impersonal, it 
was also frequently involuntary. A few recruits sent to Louis bourg were 
victims of "lettres de cachet" ;75 others were taken straight from the pris-
71 CoRVISIER, op. cit., pp. 355-56. 
72 On "racolage", see, ibid., pp. 179-95; Georges GIRARD, Racolage et Milice; Le 
service militaire en France ii Ia fin du regne de Louis XIV (Paris: 1922), pp. 75-161. Occa-
sionally Qfficers from the Isle Royale troupes de Ia marine on leave in France would raise 
some recruits for the colonies, but they did so to fill vacancies not in their companies but in 
their purses. There was an exception in 1730 when two companies were added to the garri-
son. The newly-appointed captains, de Gannes and Dailleboust, were sent to France to re-
cruit some of the men they would later lead. These officers were born in Acadia and Canada 
respectively and it is unlikely that they engaged in the traditional sort of recruitment that 
required a certain degree of mutual confidence. Still, they at least had some long-term in-
terest in the men they enlisted. AC, B, Vol. 54-2, fol. 520, "Ordre du Roy au sr. de Gannes 
pour levee de Soldats," 7 Mar., 1730. The recruitment of Swiss soldiers for service at Isle 
Royale was also impersonal. Karrer officers enlisted men for the regiment as a whole and 
not for particular companies. The officers stationed at Louisbourg had no recruitment 
responsibilities as long as they stayed in the colony. AC, F2C, Art, 3, fols. 323-26v, Decisions 
de Ia Marine, 29 June, 1722. 
73 See, for example, Port de Rochefort, IE, Vol. 86, fols. 241-46, Pontchartrain, 27 
Feb., 1715. 
74 Ibid., Vol. 116, fol. 404, Maurepas, 10 June, 1732. 
75 These were special orders of the king that, in these specific cases, were granted at 
the request of parents who wished to have troublesome sons exiled. See, for example, AC, 
Cll B, Vol. 8, fols. 55-64v, St. Ovide to Minister, 20 Nov., 1726. 
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ons of La Rochelle, 76 and of these a substantial number were army 
deserters whose lives were spared on condition that they serve in the colo-
nies.77 A great many ostensibly voluntary enlistments were doubtless the 
result of the tricks and pressure tactics of "racoleurs." It would be a mis-
take, however, to conclude that such soldats malgre eux were ever a 
majority in the Isle Royale garrison. Some men joined the colonial troops 
to escape from legal or other difficulties in France. 78 Most probably enlisted 
out of a desire for adventure, a need for security and an assured subsist-
ence or a sincere military vocation. They would likely have received a 
more substantial enlistment bounty from an infantry regiment, but they 
ended up in the troupes de Ia marine because, in many cases, their 
health, size or age would have made them unacceptable to any other 
branch of the French armed forces. 79 The number of soldiers appearing in 
the Isle Royale records who were under the official minimum height of 5 
pieds 1 pouce or below the minimum age of 18 years, is proof of the lax-
ity of recruitment standards in the colonial troops. 80 
Obviously, recruitment standards were not effectively enforced sim-
ply because sufficient numbers of volunteers could not be found 
otherwise. The colonial forces did not enjoy a good reputation in France 
and it was not so much because of their niggardly recruitment bounties or 
because service overseas was considered particularly hard. Men hesitated 
to join the troupes de Ia marine because they did not expect ever to re-
turn home once they had left Europe.81 This popular "prejudice," al-
though exaggerated, was not without foundation. While men joining the 
regular French army or the Karrer regiment were committed to serving a 
limited term (usually six years), most rec~;uits for the colonial troupes de 
Ia marine signed "engagements perpetuels" which effectively bound them 
to remain soldiers until the king saw fit to release them.82 
76 Port de Rochefort, IE, Vol. 101, fols. 617 , 621-22, de Morville, 31 May 1723. 
77 Ibid. , Vol. 87, fols . 645-51, Council, 28 May, 1716. Cf. , Corvisier, op. cit., p. 720. 
78 Thomas Beranger dit La Rosee, for example, injured a peasant in a drunken 
brawl. When criminal procedings were initiated, he fled to Rochefort and immediately joined 
the troupes de Ia marine. AC, Outremer, G2, Vol. 182, fol. 215. "Conseil Superieure . Pro-
cedure criminelle ... a l'encontre du nomme Nicolas LeBegue dt, Brulevillage et Thomas 
Beranger dt. La Rosee soldats acuses de val," 3 Mar.-2 June, 1733. 
79 Isle Royale recruiters generally received only 30 livres per man. This sum was 
supposed to cover their expenses (including enlistment bounties) and provide them with a 
profit. See, for example, Port de Rochefort, IE, Vol. 116, fols. 360-61, Maurepas, 20 May, 
1732. Even if the entire amount were turned over to the recruits it would have compared 
unfavorably with the more substantial bounties offered by the recruiters who supplied the 
other branches of the French armed forces. CoRVISifiR, op. cit., pp. 328-39. 
80 Of 21 men whose heights were recorded because they deserted or appeared in 
court between 1720 and 1745, four were under the minimum height. In the regular army, 
such short men were extremely rare. CoRVISIER, op. cit., pp. 640-41. Underage recruits 
were accepted even more readily, again in contrast with the more selective infantry. One 
governor remarked with satisfaction that the majority of the 40 soldiers arriving at Louis-
bourg in 1726 were 15 and 16 years old. AC, C II B, Vol. 8, fols, 55-64v, St. Ovide to Minis-
ter, 20 Nov., 1726. Cf., Corvisier, op. cit ., tables between p. 476 and p. 477. 
81 AC, CIIB, Vol. 33, fols . 89-9lv, de Raymond to Minister, 12 Oct., 1753. 
81 See, AC, B, Vol. 69, fol. 68, Maurepas to Duval, 22 Feb., 1739. The only system-
atic listing of terms of enlistment is a muster roll which dates from 1752. It indicates that, 
of 1067 men in the Isle Royale garrison at that time, only 59 (5.5%) had six-year "engage-
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The sources do not allow any precise calculation of the duration of 
military service at Isle Royale. However, circumstantial evidence and the 
testimony of contemporaries make it clear that soldiers in the colony, 
troupes de Ia marine much more than Swiss, generally served for un-
usually long periods. Swiss and French had little hope of terminating their 
military careers except with an official discharge and the French troupes 
de Ia marine usually obtained one only after a great many years. In 
France and in the colonies, most men left the service through death, 
desertion or discharge and the following table shows the respective import-
ance of each compared with similar statistics for a typical regiment of the 
French infantry. 
SOLDIERS LEAVING THE ISLE RoYALE GARRISON, 1721-1742.83 
total death desertion discharge other 
IR troupes de Ia marine, 1721-42. 670 130 43 470 27 
100% 19% 6% 70% 4% 
IR detachment, Karrer regt., 153 37 2 ll2* 2 
1723-24; 173a-42. 100% 24% 1% 73% 1% 
Vivarais-Infanterie regt., 3842 1374 1046 1290 132 
1716-49. 100% 36% 27% 34% 3% 
*The officials at Louis bourg could not discharge men from the Karrer regiment but only 
record their return to France where presumably they were discharged. 
These figures clearly demonstrate the preponderance of discharges as the 
end-point of soldiers' careers in the colonial garrison. This contrasts 
strongly with the situation which prevailed in the regular army where -
paradoxically, in view of the predominance of limited periods of enlist-
ment there - only one-third of the men left with discharges while 
roughly equal numbers died or deserted. The relative importance of dis-
charges does not mean that the Isle Royale authorities were more gener-
ous in this regard than their counterparts in France ; instead it is the 
result of comparatively low rates of death and desertion in the Isle Royale 
garrison. 
Between 1730 and 1740 inclusive, the average annual rate of mortal-
ity among Isle Royale soldiers, French and Swiss, was slightly less than 
ments limites" Archives du Seminaire de Quebec, Papiers Surlaville, 55-8, "Signallement 
general des trouppes de /'Isle Royale," [13 Mar., 1752]. The proportion may have been 
slightly higher before 1744. 
83 These figures were pieced together from a variety of sources. All of them, whether 
ration lists, reviews or isolated references in the governor's correspondence , were apparently 
based on the official headcounts prepared by a civilian bureaucrat and updated with in-
formation supplied by the major. The most consistent and useful source is the accounts of 
the keepers of the government storehouse. AC, C11 B, Vols. 11-25, passim., "Etat de Ia 
recette et consommation des vivres faittes dans les magasins du Roy ii /'isle Royale ... sub-
sistance des troupes ... ". They are complete for the 173a-41 period and they show the num-
ber of men supplied with rations in each company and in the Swiss contingent along with the 
date at which the number changed because of a death, desertion, discharge or the arrival of 
a recruit. These statistics are not completely reliable. Desertion in particular may have been 
somewhat under-recorded, but data on the regular army were subject to similar distortions. 
Figures on the Vivarais-Infanterie are from Corvisier, op. cit., p. 585 (cf. pp. 583-88). 
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20 per thousand.84 The annual average in the Vivarais-Infanterie regiment 
was over 80 per thousand during the same period (34 per thousand if war-
time years are excluded).85 The men of the colonial garrison were of 
course spared the rigours and dangers of campaigning, but they also lived 
in a healthy climate and seem to have suffered much less than the in-
fantry soldiers from epidemics and food shortages. The statistics are also 
affected by the artificial selection process that resulted from the govern-
ment's policy of discharging the sickly and the lame. 
Desertion from the Frerich army was quite common in the 
eighteenth century. Soldiers who were dissatisfied with the service, and 
those who were momentarily annoyed with an officer or in danger of 
being punished for a crime could generally escape and disappear into the 
surrounding population with only a minimum of planning and luck. 86 
Deserters from the Isle Royale garrison, on the other hand, found them-
selves in a wilderness that was an extremely hostile environment for Europe-
ans with a few settlements that were far too small for a fugitive to 
avoid detection. In most of the 45 recorded cases therefore, men, usually 
in groups of two or more, attempted to reach the Acadian settlements at 
Beaubassin, some 250 miles from Louisbourg in the British colony of 
Nova Scotia. The journey was difficult and perilous and the destination 
unattractive. It must be assumed that these deserters had extremely press-
ing motives for leaving the garrison - in fact, a few of them were feeing 
justice after committing a theft - or else an immoderate degree of determ-
ination of foolhardiness. 87 Of the 45, nineteen were apprehended and 
ten of these executed, a very high rate of capture by contemporary stand-
ards even if one assumes that only half the actual desertions were record-
ed. Moreover, the majority of the colony's desertions occurred at the 
outposts of Port Toulouse and Isle St. Jean which were much closer than 
Louisbourg to the mainland. Desertion, then, was hardly a practical op-
tion for Louisbourg soldiers who were unhappy with their lot. 
The official policy on discharges was frequently repeated in the 
minister's despatches to Isle Royale governors: 
83). 
/'Intention de sa majeste est que les congez ne soient donnes qu'aux In-
valides et a ceux qui voudront se faire habitans, Je vous recommande de ne 
point en congedier d' autres sans des ordres expres. 88 
84 Calculated on the basis of information derived from the ration accounts (see note 
85 CORVISIER, op. cit., pp. 684-85. 
86 Ibid., pp. 700-03. Under similar conditions, groups of French and Swiss recruits 
destined for Isle Royale were often decimated by desertion before they left France. Port de 
Rochefort, IE, Vol. 103, fol. 319, Maurepas, 6 June, 1724; AC, B, Vol. 58, fols. 167v-68, 
Maurepas to de la Croix, 13 July, 1733. , 
87 For an account of the difficulties encountered by one deserter who was eventually 
apprehended on the Nova Scotia mainland, see, AC, CIIB, Vol. 7, fols. 78-93, "Procedure 
criminelle extraordinaire instruite a I' Encontre du nomme michel Laugier d1 alexandre ac-
cuse de desertion," 18 Oct., 1724. 
88 AC, B, Vol. 53, fols. 584-84v, Maurepas to St. Ovide and de Mezy, 22 May, 1729. 
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At least 24 men left the colony's troupes de La marine between 1721 and 
1742 with "conges de grace" which their families had obtained by petition-
ing the minister and paying 150 livres to the Marine treasury. 89 A few 
other soldiers, Swiss and French, obtained discharges that were conditional 
on their remaining in the colony. The metropolitan authorities hoped 
to establish at Isle Royale a system which had contributed greatly to the 
development and population of Canada where soldiers had often been en-
couraged to inarry and settle on the land with offers of discharges and 
material assistance. 90 Because of the inferior quality of Cape Breton soils 
however and because of the absence of established agricultural communi-
ties, the military settlement programme was a failure. As the colonial 
administrators were unwilling to lose good soldiers in what they considered 
a vain scheme, only a handful received discharges or permission to 
marry. The most important result of this for our purposes was that the 
Isle Royale soldiers were denied an exit route by which many men station-
ed in Canada were able to escape from a service that was not to their 
liking. 
Most of the discharges at Isle Royale were given to men described 
as "disabled." When the documents occasionally give more details about 
individual cases, the most striking feature of the lists is the large number 
of soldiers who were sent home crippled from injuries received in ac-
cidents during the construction of the fortifications of Louisbourg. 91 
Another form of discharge, the conge d' anciennete, though not mentioned 
in the minister's instructions cited above, was awarded to old soldiers 
who had served as long as forty years. 92 Depending upon the number of 
recruits available and the vacancies created by deaths, desertions and dis-
charges of other sorts in a given year, as many as ten or twelve of these 
veterans might be released or none at all. Men on six-year enlistments 
had priority but even they were not always sent home as soon as their 
terms had expired.93 There is no way of determining the length of time 
that the majority who had unlimited enlistments served but it seems that 
in most cases it was considerable. Unless he were particularly lucky, a 
man in the troupes de La marine of Isle Royale could expect to serve for 
decades or until he was the victim of a crippling injury. Still, the Louis-
bourg official who referred to service of this sort as un Espece d' escla-
vage was exaggerating. 94 There were a number of escape hatches such 
as the conges de grace, the settler's discharges and perhaps a few ficti-
&9 For example, ibid. , Vol. 65, fol. 442v, Maurepas to St. Ovide and LeNormant, 26 
Feb., 1737. The governor and commissaire-ordonnateur were not allowed to accept money 
payments directly from soldiers anxious to purchase their freedom. The minister reserved to 
himself the right to order discharges "par des considerations particuliers. " AC, B, Vol. 74, 
fol. 563v, Maurepas to Bigot, 6 June, 1742. 
90 AC, F3, Vol. 50, fols . 161-62v, ordonnance, 26 June, 1725. Cf., Louise DECHENE, 
Habitants et Marchands de Montreal au XVII, siec/e (Paris and Montreal : 1974), pp. 80-88. 
91 AC, D2C, Vol. 47 , passim. Many of these "invalids" would have been unable to 
earn a living but only a small minority could ever hope to draw a pension. 
92 AC. C11B. Vol. 7, fol. 19, St. Ovide to Minister, 16 Nov ., 1724; ibid., Vol. 20, 
fols, 317-17v, "troupe" (unsigned, undated memoire), [1738] . 
93 AC, B, Vol. 70, fols. 389-89v, Maurepas to de Forant, 7 May, 1740. 
94 AC, C11B, Vol. 7, fols. 267-71, de Mezy to Minister, 7 Dec., 1725. 
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tious invalid's discharges. 95 However, these opportunities for departure 
were rare and unreliable. For most of the colony's French soldiers, the 
prospect of leaving the service must have appeared remote and uncertain 
in the extreme. The situation was temporarily worsened after 1743 when, 
because of the threat of war, the awarding of discharges was entirely sus-
pended in both the troupes de La marine and the Karrer regiment. 96 
It would certainly be a mistake however, to assume that every sol-
dier wanted to escape the Isle Royale garrison. There is actually one case 
of a sickly young man who cried and begged his captain not to discharge 
him as an invalid.97 The point is that, insofar as there was discontent and 
resentment in the garrison, it had few outlets. Contemporaries frequently 
remarked that the prevalence of unlimited terms of enlistment in the trou-
pes de Ia marine was productive of low morale. 98 The prospects for promo-
tion into the officer corps, which were nil, could not have improved 
matters. 99 Admittedly, six-year terms were the rule in the Karrer detach-
ment which initiated the revolt. However, since all the Swiss in the col-
ony were stationed at Louisbourg, desertion was even rarer among them 
than among the French. They were also less likely to benefit from set-
tlers' discharges. If he were angry with his officers, homesick or dis-
satisfied with military life, the Isle Royale soldier, Swiss at least as much 
as French, was discouraged from responding in an individualistic fashion. 
More than a continental French soldier who could desert with little 
chance of being punished and more than a man attached to the Canadian 
troops who could exchange the military musket for the colonist's axe with 
relative ease, he had a permanent stake in his position as a soldier. Individ-
ual evasion of the military being more difficult at Isle Royale than else-
where, collective action within the system was proportionately more like-
ly. 
Several characteristics of military life in Louisbourg operated in a 
more positive and direct way to encourage cooperative habits and a group 
spirit among the soldiers. To begin with, almost all of them were housed 
in one large barracks building. In the first half of the century, barracks 
9s For one example of a healthy man discharged as an invalid, see, AC, B, Vol. 53, 
fols. 583v-87, Maurepas to St. Ovide and de Mezy, 22 May, 1729. 
96 Ibid., Vol. 76, fols. 50-50v, "Ordonnance du Roy qui suspend Ia delivrance des 
conges aux Soldats des Troupes des Colonies jusqu'au premier Janvier 1745," 20 Mar., 
1743. 
97 
" •• • etant toujours attaque de I' escorbut son capitaine voulu le congedier, mais 
le Repondant qui pour lors n'avait qu'environ seize a dix sept ans se mit a pleurer, disant 
que s'il etait congedie il ne scaurait que faire pour gagner sa vie ... " This soldier adds that 
his reluctance to leave the island produced a great deal of consternation among his com-
rades. AC, C 11 B, Vol. 17, fols. 296-315v, cc11rt-rnartial of Joseph Lagand dit Picard, charged 
with desertion, 24 Oct., 1736. 
98 Ibid., Vol. 33, fols. 89-91v, de Raymond to Minister, 12 Oct., 1753. 
99 Only one man from the ranks, Jean Loppinot, received a commission in the col-
ony's troupes de Ia marine before 1745. AC, D2C, Vol. 47, "Isle Royalle - Officiers de 
guerre," 8 May, 1730. Loppinot was an exceptional case, having come with many of the 
original officers of the Isle Royale garrison from Acadia where his family was politically 
prominent. R. J. MoRGAN, "A History of Block 16, Louisbourg; 1713-1768," (typed manu-
script, Fortress of Louisbourg project, Louisbourg, 1975), p. 59. 
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were still a novelty and, in many French garrison towns and throughout 
Canada, troops were dispersed and billeted in the homes of civilians. 100 In 
Louisbourg, by contrast, every man was in close contact with his com-
rades and especially with the fifteen or twenty who shared his room and 
who together formed a group called a "chambree." Besides sharing 
common living and sleeping quarters, the men of a chambree ate together 
and cooked common meals in one large pot. They also tended to spend a 
great deal of their leisure time together and the barracks room was a 
favourite spot for drinking, conversation and lounging. Not only was the 
chambree an important unit in a soldier's life -Renard, Soly and Dupa-
quier, the three principal instigators of the mutiny were apparently of the 
same room - but the barracks environment, where officers seldom enter-
ed, was well suited for the discussion of grievances and for conspiracies 
and plans for concerted action. The frequency of munities among naval 
forces has often been explained in terms of the solidarity bred by life in 
the fo'c's'le. 101 Similarly, the Louisbourg revolt can be seen partly as a 
result of the barracks situation which helped · to foster a sense of commu-
nity and also provided an environment favourable to secret organized 
action. The accounts of the mutiny show that the leaders took good advan-
tage of its potential. 
Outside the barracks, the men of the Louisbourg garrison, like sol-
diers everywhere, were in constant contact with their fellows while en-
gaged in such activities as guard-duty and drills. What makes them unique 
however is the-fact that so many of them devoted very little time to these 
military pursuits as they worked six months of every year, building 
Louisbourg's fortifications. The construction of a European-style fortress 
in North America was an ambitious project and one which was never 
completed. Since civilian workers could not be persuaded to come to the 
colony, all the unskilled labour was performed by the troops of the garri-
son. 102 Not all the soldiers were employed in this way. Many were not 
strong enough for the heavy work involved and a number were always 
required for duty in the outposts and guardrooms. In the 1720s when 
many of the massive excavations were completed, more than half of the 
colony's soldiers worked on the fortifications. 103 By the years around 
1740, the proportion of working soldiers may have been somewhat smaller 
but most of the men must have had some experience as construction 
workers. Canada also has a labour shortage and many men in the troupes 
de Ia marine stationed there were allowed to take jobs in the community. 
10° CoRVISIER, op. cit., p. 94; W.J. EccLES, Frontenac, the Courtier Governor (To-
ronto: 1968), p. 220. 
101 T.H. WINTRINGHAM, Mutiny; Being a Survey of Mutinies from Sparta-
cus to Invergordon (London: 1936), p. 256. 
102 F.J. THORPE, "The Politics of French Public Construction in the Islands of the 
Gulf of St. Lawrence, 1695-1758" (unpubl. Ph. D. diss., University of Ottawa, 1973), pp. 
232-62. 
103 In September, 1724, for example, when the strength of the colonial garrison was 
no more than 430, there were 236 soldiers (along with 17 civilians) employed in the construc-
tion of the fortifications. AC, C" B, Vol. 7, fols.156-56v, de Verville, "Etat des ouvriers ... ," 
[Sept., 1724]. 
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However, the soldiers from Canada were generally employed by private 
individuals, and so their work, like their system of lodging, had the effect 
of dispersing them. 104 Some·Isle Royale soldiers also found employment 
with civilian parties but generally the voracious labour demands of state-
financed construction at Louisbourg tended to concentrate them at one 
place under one employer. 
If there were factors promoting a certain group feeling among 
Louisbourg's soldiers, there were nevertheless some divisions within the 
garrison that precluded the formation of a completely unified outlook. 
First of all, non-commissioned officers wielded considerable authority 
over the men in their daily affairs and received higher wages. The thirty 
members of the elite artillery company were also better paid than the 
other French soldiers. Because of their specialized duties, the cannoneers 
did not work on the fortifications and they were further set off from the 
others by their special barracks rooms and distinctive uniforms. 105 Most 
importantly, both the cannoneers and the French sergeants owed their 
special positions to the officers' appreciation of their superior merit (Cor-
porals were chosen on the basis of seniority alone). 106 Not surprisingly, 
they stayed aloof from the mutiny. 
The most significant complicating factor in the Louisbourg garrison 
however was the division between Swiss and French. The men of the 
Karrer regiment with its special privileges, traditions and procedures were 
separated from the others in many of the external formalities of military 
life, such as uniforms and drum signals, and also in some more essential 
matters, such as pay. Many of them were Protestants and most spoke 
German as a first language. The few glimpses of the soldiers' daily life 
afforded by judicial records give the impression that socializing between 
French and Swiss was not common. A Swiss or a French soldier would 
have had more extensive dealings with others of his own group, and 
especially those who were in his company and chambree. In the 22 years 
the Karrer regiment was represented in the garrison however, its members 
would have had considerable contact with the men of the troupes de ·Ia 
marine as they worked together on the fortifications, served together in 
mixed guard details and were housed in the same building and treated in 
the same hospital. There is even evidence of a high degree of mutual 
trust between individual French and Swiss in the two recorded desertions 
from the Karrer detachment. In both cases, a Swiss soldier fted with a 
group of French deserters. 107 Generally, the two major components of the 
Louisbourg garrison lived separately but enjoyed harmonious relations. 
Certainly, there is no evidence of hostility of the sort that led to fist-fights 
and duels between the men of two infantry regiments that were stationed 
to• EccLES, Frontenac, the Courtier Governor, pp. 215-18; C.J. Russ, "Les Troupes 
de Ia Marine, 1683-1713" (unpubl. M.A. thesis, McGill, 1971), pp. 95-98. 
tos AC, CuB, Vol. 26, fols. 236-38, ordonnance, 20 June, 1743. 
106 Ibid., Vol. 21, fol. 55v, de Forant to Minister, 2 Oct., 1739. 
107 Ibid., Vol. 18, fols. 85-87, LeNormant to Minister, 6 July, 1736; ibid., Vol. 23, 
fols. 60-64, Duquesnel to Minister, 19 Oct., 1741. 
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at Louisbourg in the 1750s. In the early stages of the mutiny, the French 
and the Swiss acted independently but their differing tactics were aimed 
at achieving essentially, though not exactly, identical objectives, 
Although the men of the Louis bourg garrison did not form a complete-
ly cohesive group, they shared a common awareness of their distinct 
identity as soldiers that, along with the factors mentioned earlier, helps 
to explain the solidarity they manifested during the mutiny. The judicial 
records occasionally give indications of the importance they attached to 
the external signs of the warrior's profession. In one case, two men were 
convicted of breaking into a house and stealing a few items of little value. 
One of their prizes was a piece of ribbon which they had a tavern keeper's 
wife fashion into fifteen cocardes so that they and their comrades could 
wear these specifically military adornments in their hats. 108 Another in-
cident resulted from a dispute between a butcher named Dupre and a 
Swiss soldier who wished to sell some partridges he had shoL At one 
point, the soldier threatened to hit his opponent with the butt of his musket 
but the butcher managed to wrestle the weapon away from him. Hurling 
insults behind him, the vanquished soldier retreated towards the barracks 
but returned later, accompanied by two Swiss armed with sticks and 
demanded the return of his gun. When Dupre refused, the three attacked 
him, calling him bougre and shouting, Tu desarme un soldat. They 
beat him savalgely, stabbed him in the chest and finally left him in the 
street, unconscious and gravely wounded. 109 The accounts of the victim 
and other witnesses give no hint that any national or religious· animosity 
was involved in this ·incident. Instead, the brutal actions of the Swis.s can 
best be interpreted as revenge against what they considered to be a serious 
offence on the part of a civilian who deprived a soldier of his weapon, 
the distinguishing mark of the military estate. 110 Similarly, anger over the 
treatment of the · volunteers who participated in the Canso. expedition -
ariger which helped produce the outbre~ ·in December, 1744- should pe 
seen as a product of the traditional notion that' a victorious warrior ought 
to receive a share of the fruits of conquest, 
Behind the actions of the mutineers seems to be the general belief 
that a soldier is an armed · man who receives the king's money and his 
bread, as well as plunder on appropriate occasions, in order to fight his 
master's enemies and protect his possessions. When the men were given 
bad rations without what they considered legitimate reason, they felt not 
only deprived but insulted. Being made to work at unsoldierlike tasks 
without remuneration . was also galling. The cannoneers received high 
wages for their special duties and skills, but the other soldiers felt they 
were entitled to their subsistence pay by virtue of performing strictly 
108 AC, Outremer, G2, Vol. 182, fols. 148-357, "Conseil Superieur Procedure crimi-
nelle ... a l'encontre du nomme Nicolas LeBegue dit Brulevillage, et Thomas Berranger dit 
La Rosee soldats acuses devol." 3 Mar.-2 June, 1733. 
109 Ibid., VoL 179, fols. 462-502, "Conseil Superieur-Procedure Criminelle a l'En-
contre de Reintender Sergent Suisse et deux autres Complices accuses de vol. [sic]," 11 
Sept. -20 Oct., 1727. 
110 BADEAU, op. cit., I, p. 240. 
330 HISTOIRE SOCIAL£ -SOCIAL HISTORY 
military service such as guard-duty. 111 Work in itself was not unacceptable 
as long as it was considered quite independent of a man's duties and status 
as a soldier and was paid for as such. What incensed the mutineers was 
having their officers treat them as mere labourers rather than as men-at-
arms who occasionally worked for extra money. At his court-martial, 
Joseph Renard was asked if he had any complaints against his officers. 
He replied, 
qu'il avoit grievemt. lieu· de se p/aindre des Torts a luy arrives par Ia mauvaise 
qualite des Vivres qui faisoient partie de sa so/de ainsy que de tous /es ou-
vrages qu' on I' avoit force de faire a Ia descente de Ia garde et cela sans salaire 
quoique ces ouvrages Etoient Independans de son Service et de son devoir ... 112 
The authorities shared the soldiers' attitude to a large degree and they 
never questioned the proposition that men who worked on the fortifica-
tions should be given a supplement to their normal Wages. The way in 
which this extra pay was remitted however was not always to the soldier-
workers' satisfaction and the economic history of Louisbourg's military 
labour force sheds a great deal of light on the origins of the soldiers' 
hostility towards their officers which characterized the mutiny. 
The construction of Louisbourg's fortifications was not administered 
directly by the crown but rather farmed out to a private contractor who 
was responsible, among other things, for paying the soldier-workers. The 
state nevertheless took an active role in the project, partly through the 
chief engineer, a military officer independent of the colony's military 
command, who superintended the works and was in charge of the discipline 
of the work force. The engineer and the contractor usually cooperated 
closely but the governor also had some authority over the works and he 
and the other staff and company officers also exercised authority over the 
men. 113 Thus the administration was complicated and, in the 1720s when 
the soldier-workers still received their wages directly from the contractor, 
they were often able to take advantage of the fact that the engineer together 
with the contractor was often at odds with the governor and the officers, 
and neither party was able to claim their undivided obedience. 
Although theoretically free agents in the labour market, physically 
fit soldiers who were not required for duty in the outposts and guard-
rooms were often obliged to work. One of their primary tasks was excavat-
ing and moving earth for the massive ramparts and ditches and they work-
ed as day labourers or, more frequently, on a piece-work basis in gangs 
led by a "chef d'attelier" who was himself presumably a soldier.U4 The 
workers were allowed to negotiate pay scales collectively with the contrac-
111 This attitude was also manifested, for example, among the French dragoons who, 
in the time of Louis XIV, refused to help collect taxes. " Nous nous sommes engages pour 
dragons, et non pour sergeants et porteurs de contraintes." Ibid., I, p. 235. 
I 12 Renard court-martial. 
113 THORPE, op. cit ., p. 251. 
114 The sources shed little light on the organization and function of these gangs and 
only mention the "chefs d'atteliers" occasionally and incidentally. AC, B, Vol. 99, fols. 
·245-49, "Instructions pour le S'. franquet Deur des fortiffications de Ia Nil•, france sur les 
ouvrages que leRoy veut etre executees a /'isle Royale," 12 May, 1754. 
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tors and, in the early years, they occasionally staged demonstrations and 
refused to work in order to force their employer to raise the rates. 115 The 
governor could intervene in case of deadlock. He was not directly in-
terested in keeping down construction costs but was more concerned about 
morale and about the difficulties of keeping the soldiers at the fortifications 
at a time when a boom in private construction provided them with an 
alternative source of employment. Therefore, he often settled disputes in 
favour of the men. 116 As the only substantial work force in the 1720s when 
public works in the colony were particularly extensive, the soldiers were 
in a relatively strong position and one that was in some ways strengthened 
by their military status, which meant that their subsistence was secure 
and their physical welfare the responsibility of the company captains. It is 
difficult to determine how much money the soldier-workers earned as a 
result but the minister of Marine concluded from the reports of "strikes" 
and "emeutes" that they were becoming rich and consequently insubor-
dinate. 117 It was one thing to establish pay rates however, and another to 
collect the actual wages. Owing to delays in forwarding funds, the 
contractor frequently found himself unable to pay the men in cash and 
resorted to the expedients of distributing notes which could only be re-
deemed at a discount, or paying in goods, especially wine. When funds 
were available, the workers were paid every two weeks, after which, 
according to the authorities, the majority went straight to the taverns and 
did not reappear for several days. 118 
As a wage earner the soldier-worker, was well-placed, but as a 
consumer he was extremely vulnerable. Since soldiers were not allowed 
to buy from merchants on credit, the custom was established from the 
earliest years of the colony's existence of giving each captain a monopoly 
on sales to the men of his company. 119 This commerce was considered a 
duty as well as a privilege as it consisted mainly of essential items such as 
shres and stockings - the standard military issues of these articles were 
never sufficient - as well as tobacco, liquor and extra food. 120 The 
officers provided these ''fournitures" at greatly inflated prices and, in 
order to collect their debts, simply had the 30 sols per month that remained 
of their men's military wages after deductions paid directly into their 
hands. This monopoly was not complete however, and in the 1720s the 
captains frequently complained of the contractor's practice of increasing 
115 The engineer and contractor reported these "contestations tumultueuses" and 
"emeutes" without providing details. AC, C 11 B, Vol. 5, fols. 235-37, de Verville to Council, 
19 June, 1720; ibid., Vol. 6, fols, 127-30, Isabeau to Council, 30 Nov., 1722. 
116 Ibid., Vol. 7, fols. 142-50, de Verville, memoire, [17241. 
117 
" ••• les travaux que I' on fait dans cette isle donnant /'occasion au soldat de g_agner 
de I' argent l'aysance qu'elle leur [sic] procure le rend delicat et difficile." AC, B. Vol. 52-2v, 
fols, 574v-77, Maurepas to St. Ovide, 18 June, 1728. In 1719, the engineer estimated that a 
man could earn five livres per day and 465/ivres in a season. AC, Cll B, Vol. 4, fols. 66-68, 
de Verville to Council, 24 Jan., 1719. 
118 AC, C11B, Vol. 5, fol. 136v, St. Ovide and de Mezy to Minister, 10 Nov., 1720. 
119 Ibid., Vol. 1, fols. 73-76v, l'Hermitte to Council, 3 Nov., 1714; AC, B, Vol. 88-1, 
fols. 175-75v, Maurepas to Guillet, 15 Oct., 1748. 
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his profits by advancing goods to the workers in lieu of wages. 121 Further-
more, these officers claimed the soldier-workers consumed much more 
merchandise than their military pay would afford and, although they 
had to be given clothing to protect them from the winter, they quickly 
squandered any cash they received from the contractor in the summer 
and neglected to repay their officers. 122 Thus, captains and contractors 
struggled for a greater share of the soldier-worker's earnings. 
In the early years, the contractor had the advantage of being support-
ed by the Marine ministry but the captains had the backing of the col· 
onial'governor. The officers scored their first victory in 1721 when they ob-
tained permission for a sergeant to be present at paydays in order to 
compel workers in need of new clothing to purchase it on the spot. 123 The 
contractor successfully resisted these pretentions however, and in 1727 
the French officers complained that their men were being paid mostly in 
merchandise and in advance. They asked that the wages soldiers earned 
working on the fortifications, like their military wages, be turned over 
from the contractor to the company captains who could deduct the value 
of each man's debts and pay him the balance in cash.i24 This was already 
the practice in the Swiss contingent but it was not until some time in the 
1730-1735 period that the officers of the troupes de Ia marine gained such 
complete control over the fruits of their men's labour. How or why they 
defeated their opponent is not clear but it is certain that, from that time 
until 1744, the captains derived a substantial portion of their total incomes 
from the profits they made from their soldier-workers. They were not neg-
ligent in searching for ways to increase these. · 
The administration of the Isle Royale garrison was never very 
orderly before 1745 and there is no indication that the captains were obliged 
to keep close accounts or to report to anyone on how they disposed of 
the workers' wages with which they were entrusted. They soon began 
paying the men their cash balances only once a year at the end of the 
construction season, thereby all but eliminating the possibility that any of 
them could stay out of debf 125 In view of the limited demand for shirts 
and shres, they expanded their merchandising facilities, concentrating on 
an institution called the canteen. In the 1730s and forties, each captain 
operated a canteen where his men could drink wine and spirits on credit 
and at exorbitant prices. Complaints about the canteens and their effects 
on drunkenness and absenteeism multiplied around 1740 when there were 
even allegations that officers forced working soldiers to spend their earn-
ings on drink. 126 When the newly-appointed governor Duquesne} arrived 
121 Ibid., Vol. 5, fols. 386-88v, St. Ovide to Minister, 30 Nov., 1721. 
122 Ibid., Vol. 4, fols. 285-85v, Petition of de Rouville to the Comte de Toulouse, 
1719. 
123 AC, B, Vol. 44-2, fol. 569v, Council to St. Ovide, I July, 1721. 
124 AC, CIIB, Vol. 9, fols . 72-78v, St. Ovide to Minister, 21 Nov., 1727. 
125 Ibid., Vol. 23, fols. 88-90v, Bigot to Minister, 15 Oct., 1741; ibid., Vol. 29, fols . 
306-15, Franquet to Minister, 13 Oct., 1750. 
126 See, for example, AC, B, Vol. 68, fols. 347-48v, Maurepas to de Forant and Bigot, 
26 May, 1739. 
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in the colony, he reported that the soldier-workers generally received no 
money whatsrever and he identified the situation as as un viel mal. 
II faut attaquer les fournitures qu'on fait aux soldats et les Cantines, qui font 
que que/que travail que fasse un travailleur, il ne voit }amais un sol on luy fait 
tout Consommer, de Ia livrongnerie et le degout pour le travail, auquel ils ne 
vont que forces. u 7 
In the late 1730s and early 1740s, the minister of Marine in France 
manifested a concern · over abuses in the Louis bourg garrison that in-
dicates he thought matters were more serious there than in Canada where 
the officers' routine appropriation of the military pay of working soldiers 
had been tolerated for years. 128 He had received reports about the confisca-
tion of soldier-workers' pay and about other forms of exploitation, such 
as the captains' practice of taking the uniforms from the bodies of dead 
soldiers and "selling" them to new recruits. 129 Two new governors were 
appointed from outside the colony, de Forant in 1739 and Duquesnel in 
1740, and instructed to remedy the situation. The officers were threatened 
with exemplary punishment unless they began treating their men more 
fairly and Maurepas actually went so far as to suspend the awarding of 
the Croix de St. Louis in the garrison in 1742. 130 Neither the minister 
nor the governors however could effectively oppose the firmly entrenched 
interests of the officers. The latter convinced them that their salaries were 
not sufficient to support a family in a difficult and expensive colony like 
Isle Royale. Consequently, no fundamental change was made in the sys-
tem of exploitation which left a captain free to dispose of his men and 
their earnings as he saw fit. 131 Still, the governors exercised some restrain-
ing influence over the officers. However, when Duquesne! died in October 
1744 and the command was assumed by Duchambon, a veteran of the 
Isle Royale officer corps, there is reason to suspect that the inhibitions 
that limited officers' profiteering at the soldiers' expense were abandoned. 
The gap in outlook, background and material interests between the 
Louisbourg soldiers and their officers was considerable. The impersonal 
recruiting practices of the Karrer regiment and the troupes de La marine 
were not of a sort to reinforce the soldier's deferential attitude to his 
superiors nor his attachment to his company commander. Neither did the 
divided loyalties that accompanied the soldiers' employment under the 
127 AC, CIIB, Vol. 22, fol. 93v, Duquesne! to Minister, 1 Dec., 1740. 
us Russ, op. cit., pp. 181-83. In Canada; even this relatively mild form of exploitation 
aroused the indignation and opposition of the bishop and clergy. If Canadian officers were 
more restrained in this regard than were their Isle Royale counterparts, the difference can be 
explained partly in terms of the more complex public elite of the St. Lawrence colony which 
was not so completely dominated by the military. However, the greater ease with · which 
Canadian soldiers could leave the service, and the officers' consequent concern about morale, 
may have been more important. 
ll9 AC, B, Vol. 68, fols. 347-48v. Maurepas to de Forant and Bigot, 26 May; 1739. 
130 Ibid., Vol. 74, fols. 592-92v, Maurepas to Duquesne!, 15 June, 1742. 
131 Although Duquesne! claimed that he abolished the canteens in 1741 (AC, C11 B, 
Vol. 23, fols. 24-29, Duquesne! and Bigot to Minister, 20 Oct., 1741), subsequent correspon-
dence shows that he did no more than limit their operation Ibid ., Vol. 24, fols. 52-52v, 
Duquesne! to Minister, 7 Oct., 1742. 
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fortifications contractor enhance the officers' authority. More important 
though was the unexampled economic tyranny which the officers, as pay-
masters, creditors and monopoly retailers, exercised over their men. As 
they gained exclusive control over the soldiers' earnings, they used their 
power for increasingly blatant exploitation which probably had a severe 
effect on their men's material prosperity. Whether it impoverished them 
or not however, it certainly appeared unjust to its victims and, more than 
anything else, it accounts for the discontent that eventually led to violence. 
The company officers at Isle Royale showed more concern for their 
own profits than for their men's morale but they had little incentive to do 
otherwise. In the regular French army, by contrast, captains who wished 
to minimize the considerable trouble and expense of recruitment had a 
selfish interest in preventing desertion and encouraging re-enlistment by 
keeping their men as contented as possible. 132 Colonial officers of the 
Karrer regiment as well as the troupes de Ia marine, on the other hand, 
had no regular recruitment responsibilities and those resident at Louis-
bourg were in relatively little danger of losing men through desertion and 
military settlement programmes, regardless of the level of morale. 
As it was so difficult for soldiers, especially those who served in the 
troupes de Ia marine, to leave the colonial garrison, Louisbourg was very 
much a "pressure-cooker." As the officers' exploitation became more 
intense, there was no real "safety valve" of desertion which otherwise 
might have rid the community of its most disaffected elements. Instead, 
the likelihood of a major explosion increased. This is not to say that the 
relationship between stimulus and response was mechanical in any literal 
sense. Rather, the objective circumstances of the soldier's position in 
Louisbourg were such that aggressive group action was a relatively fea-
sible reaction to severe discontent. Individual evasion was not a practical 
alternative as it was for many of the French troops stationed in France 
and in Canada. Moreover, factors such as the systems of work and lodg-
ing gave the men experience that enabled them to think and act collective-
ly. 
Already, in the 1720s, the soldier-workers had been involved in 
confrontations resembling modern strikes. Their opponent however was 
generally the fortifications contractor. When the company captains gained 
control of their wages in the following decade, the men were much less 
bold in dealing with such powerful and prestigious adversaries who had at 
their disposal the military system of discipline and punishment. As a 
result, there were no reported "emeutes" from the late 1720s until 1744. In 
the end, the soldiers only overcame their fear and deference when the ex-
ploitation they suffered became particularly severe and when the state of 
war temporarily strengthened their hand. 
Nevertheless, although these structural and short-term factors that 
produced both unity and discontent among the soldiers made a confronta-
132 BABEAU, op. cit., I, pp. 176-80. 
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tion likely in 1744, they do no entirely account for the outbreak of mutiny 
by themselves. Soldiers in the eighteenth century simply were not accus-
tomed to defying their officers. Like other contemporary groups from 
among the popular classes, they only opposed their superiors openly 
when they were convinced that their cause was a righteous one. The 
"justifying ideology" that sanctioned the revolt and determined the form 
it took can, to some extent, be inferred from the mutineers' words and 
actions. Certainly the men felt their actions were legitimate. They showed 
no desire to command in the place of their officers, but only to force the 
latter to rule in a proper fashion. Therefore the mutiny as an open revolt 
ended quickly and the men returned to nominal subordination as soon as 
assurances were given that their grievances would be redressed. 
Throughout the period that followed, the leaders drew up accounts and 
negotiated payments in an orderly fashion without ever challenging the 
authority of the commissaire-ordonnateur. The soldiers had only resorted 
to force after milder forms of protest were ignored. This type of action 
was, of course, extremely destructive of military subordination, but it was 
intended only as a temporary emergency measure that would compel the 
authorities to correct the situation in which wages and other benefits were 
unlawfully withheld. The men seemed quite confident that their aims were 
not a threat to the hierarchical system since they merely demanded that 
actual practice in the garrison be consistent with official policy. 
What the soldiers sought in 1744 was "justice" and the word itself 
occurs frequently in the court-martials and other records of the mutiny. 
On the surface, the justice they demanded was in the form of monetary 
compensation for material losses to cheating officers. On another level, 
they were asking to be treated with the respect due to a soldier. A sol-
dier, these men apparently felt, earned plunder and subsistence wages by 
fighting and guarding. He might agree to perform other, unrelated duties 
in return for pay but he should not be used as a beast of burden or as a 
milk-cow by those who exercised military authority over him. From the 
mutineers' point of view, it was the officers who had subverted the mil-
itary system over the years, and the soldiers who were obliged to restore a 
proper balance. Their procedures, as they assembled behind the barracks 
to the beat of drums and under the supervision of corporals, were em-
inently soldier-like and consistent with their limited objectives. 
VI 
Was the mutiny a success? In the short-term, the men's limited 
objectives were apparently achieved. They were given compensation for un-
fair wage deductions - admittedly, the sources do not make it clear whether 
the soldiers were ever completely satisfied on this point - and the 
officers and government officals treated them with respect. Trusting the 
authorities' promises of amnesty however, they were defeated in the end. 
It is possible that matters might have ended differently had the garrison 
not had the bad luck to be conquered six months after the first uprising 
and sent to France where the soldiers' power relation with the officers 
was reversed. A few men might have been saved from the hangman in 
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this case and the officers might have been more .restrained in their 
profiteering as long as their memory of the mutiny remained vivid, but the 
economic and power position of the soldiers would not have changed in 
any fundamental or enduring way. Since they had no intention of effecting 
any institutional or structural changes in the garrison, it is difficult to imag-
ine their revolt resulting in anything more than a temporary modification 
of the existing order. 
The ffi;Utiny was not without lasting results, however. The minister 
of Marine had attempted to reform the abuses in the Isle Royale garrison 
from as early ·as 1739 but, when the colony was re-established as a 
French possession in 1749, the recollection of the violence of 1744 must 
have added some urgency to his campaign to reform the military admin-
istration. As a result, the garrison was run in a much more regular fashion 
in the second period. There was still exploitation but it was controlled 
and systematized so that Captains were limited to profits of 25 percent on 
purchases made by their men. 133 Perhaps the soldiers found this parasitic 
system less annoying than the more blatant one that prevailed earlier. In 
any case, no further incidents of organized resistance at Louisbourg were 
recorded. However, most of the "structural causes" of the mutiny remained 
after 1749. The fundamental characteristics of military life in the col-
ony were always of a sort that insurrection was possible, since they 
promoted solidarity among the soldiers and alienated them from the officers. 
Accordingly, ·in 1750 the engineer Franguet still observed among the 
soldier-workers "un Esprit de Sedition et de revolte." 134 
m AC, C liB, Vol. 28, fols. 44v-46, Desherbiers and Prevost to Minister, 21 Oct., 
1749. 
134 Ibid., Vol. 29; fols. 313v-14, Franquet to Minister, 13 Oct., 1750. 
